I’m Toby. I am a Doctor of Philosophy of philosophy.
I am currently working as a postdoctoral researcher under the Chair in Decision Theory, in the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU).
In my work I focus on using the tools of formal philosophy to approach traditional philosophical problems. I am particularly interested in whether seemingly intractable philosophical debates might be advanced by examining them in the light of practical, and not only theoretical, rationality.
In 2021 I completed my PhD at the Australian National University, with a thesis on the connection between free will and causal decision theory. In addition to a B.A. in philosophy, I hold a B.Sc. in advanced mathematics and physics, both from the University of Sydney.
My present research focuses on exploring the traditional problem of free will from the perspective of decision theory. I am interested in what decision theory might be able to tell us about free will; particularly whether different views about the metaphysics of free will might make a difference to what we should do in concrete decision situations. I am also thinking about how formalising views and arguments about free will in a decision theoretic way might force us to rethink some foundational assumptions in decision theory. For example, modelling the problems of free will in decision theory forces us to grapple with both how we should model the options that rational decision-makers have and how they should respond to uncertainty about which options they have.
I am also currently working on an approach to the paradoxes of truth and self-reference (the liar and friends) using a transparent/deflationary conception of truth and the resources of the medieval cassationist approach to the liar (as revived by Laurence Goldstein).
Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon, “Causal Decision Theory, Two-Boxing, and Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Reply to Sandgren and Williamson,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Forthcoming.