I’m Toby. I am a Doctor of Philosophy of philosophy.

I am currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), my position is supported by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

In my work I focus on using the tools of formal philosophy to approach traditional philosophical problems. I am particularly interested in whether seemingly intractable philosophical debates might be advanced by examining them in the light of practical, and not only theoretical, rationality.

In 2021 I completed my PhD at the Australian National University, with a thesis on the connection between free will and causal decision theory. In addition to a B.A. in philosophy, I hold a B.Sc. in advanced mathematics and physics, both from the University of Sydney.

Current Research

My Alexander von Humboldt Foundation project is entitled ``What can I do?: Modelling Option-Uncertainty in Decision Theory". As the title suggests, the aim of this project is to develop formal models to understand how rational decision-makers should respond to uncertainty about what their options are (or, in other words, what they can do).

I also continue, from my PhD research, to think about the relationship between traditional problems of free will and decision theory. I defend a view I call Libertarian Decision Theory: roughly, that rational decision-makers must presuppose that their choices are uncaused and unconstrained by the past and the laws of nature (though they almost certainly should not believe that). More broadly I am interested in carefully characterising the problems, and their potential solutions, that arise when decision-makers reflect on the causes of their own choices.

Some other things I have been thinking about recently include the difficulties that Causal Decision Theory has with dynamic/diachronic decision situations, deflationary truth based solutions to the semantic paradoxes, and self-referential paradoxes in decision theory.

Published Papers

Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon, “Causal Decision Theory, Two-Boxing, and Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Reply to Sandgren and Williamson,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 3 (2022): 620-27.
Preprint PDF

Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon, “Causal Decision Theory’s Predetermination Problem,” Synthese 198, no. 6 (2021): 5623–54.
Preprint PDF


Open CV/Resume


Email: tcpsolomon@gmail.com

A picture so you can spot me at conferences:

TCP Solomon