Hi
I’m Toby. I am a Doctor of Philosophy of philosophy.
I am currently a postdoc (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, part of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
My research focuses on using the tools of formal philosophy to approach traditional philosophical problems. I am particularly interested in whether seemingly intractable philosophical debates might be advanced by examining them in the light of practical, and not only theoretical, rationality.
In 2021 I completed my PhD at the Australian National University, with a thesis on the connection between free will and causal decision theory. In addition to a B.A. in philosophy, I hold a B.Sc. in advanced mathematics and physics, both from the University of Sydney.
Current Research
Some things I have been thinking about recently include the difficulties that Causal Decision Theory has with dynamic/diachronic decision situations, self-referential paradoxes in decision theory, and self-fulfilling beliefs considered from the Bayesian perspective.
From 2023-2025 my research was supported by an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation project entitled ``What can I do?: Modelling Option-Uncertainty in Decision Theory". As the title suggests, this project focused on understanding how rational decision-makers should respond to uncertainty about what their options are (or, in other words, uncertainty about what they can do). Amongst other results, I argue that decision theory must take options to be fully subjective, even though this conflicts with the famous ought—implies—can principle.
I also continue, from my PhD research, to think about the relationship between traditional problems of free will and decision theory. I defend a view I call Libertarian Decision Theory: roughly, that rational decision-makers must presuppose that their choices are uncaused and unconstrained by the past and the laws of nature (though they almost certainly should not believe that). More broadly I am interested in carefully characterising the problems, and their potential solutions, that arise when decision-makers reflect on the causes of their own choices.
Published Papers
Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon, “Causal Decision Theory, Two-Boxing, and Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Reply to Sandgren and Williamson,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 3 (2022): 620-27.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1968448
Preprint PDF
Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon, “Causal Decision Theory’s Predetermination Problem,” Synthese 198, no. 6 (2021): 5623–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02425-0
Preprint PDF
CV
Contact
Email: tcpsolomon@gmail.com
A picture so you can spot me in the wild:
