Deliberative Freedom Bibilography and Timeline V. 1 – BAT

This is the first post in what I hope to be a series of bibliographies/timelines dealing with subjects related to deliberation, determinism, indeterminism and free will. This version covers those who have engaged in debate about the Belief in Ability Thesis (the claim that rational deliberation/decision-making requires belief in the ability to perform more than one action) as well as a few related people from the free will literature who do not discuss BAT directly. I have distinguished Deliberation-Compatibilists primarily on whether they endorse an epistemic reading of BAT (you merely need to have more than one epistemically possible action to deliberate rationally) or reject it entirely. Next time I hope to begin adding in philosophers from the decision theory side of things. I am particularly interested in knowing if I have missed anyone out here (full references follow at the bottom of the post):

Ginet 1966 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist (?) – Original Consequence Argument which could be applied to decision-making.

Taylor 1964,1966,1968 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist

Jones 1968 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to Taylor 1968.

Cowan 1969 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Appears to deny any form of BAT, i.e. accepts that deliberation is compatible with knowing what you will do.

Van Inwagen 1983 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Consequence argument could be applied to decision-making, and the famous Two Door case.

Dennett 1984 – Deliberation-Compatibilist, see Ch. 5

Waller 1985 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to van Inwagen 1983, rejects any version of BAT

Kapitan 1986 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT

Small 1988 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT

Kapitan 1989 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT

Pettit 1989 – Deliberation-Compatibilist  – Argues for a negative/epistemic reading of BAT

Clarke 1992 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Rejects any form of BAT (allows agents to deliberate even if they know what they will do).

Bok 1998 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Endorses a kind of perspectivist view on which we must take ourselves to be free in decision-making, but this does not affect our beliefs.

Searle 2001 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist (See 10-14)

Broadie 2001 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Novel argument on the basis of knowability of counterfactuals.

Nelkin 2004a, 2004b – Deliberation-Compatibilist

Coffman and Warfield 2005 – Agnostic – Endorses a strong reading of BAT but does not take sides on the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate.

Levy 2006 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT

Pereboom 2008 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT

Henden 2010 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist

Stapleton 2010 (dissertation) – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Argument on the basis of psychology/non-ideal rationality.

Nelkin 2011 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Not entirely clear on whether she endorses an epistemic reading of BAT or rejects it entirely.

Nielsen 2011 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Argues against any form of BAT

Clarke 2013 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to Nelkin 2011

Pereboom 2014 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT

Pendergraft 2014 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Religious context but argument does not depend on any religious assumptions.

Fernandes 2016 – Deliberation-Compatibilist-ish – Beginning to bridge the gap between the free will/action theory literature and decision theory.

Cohen 2017 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Four cases manipulation argument against deliberation-compatibilism


Full References:

Bok, Hilary. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Broadie, Sarah. “From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 21–37.
Clarke, Randolph. “Deliberation and Beliefs About One’s Abilities.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 2 (1992): 101–13.
———. “Abilities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86, no. 2 (March 2013): 451–58.
Coffman, E. J., and Ted A. Warfield. “Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2005): 25–44.
Cohen, Yishai. “Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 1–21.
Cowan, J. L. “Deliberation and Determinism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1969): 53–61.
Dennett, Daniel C. Elbow Room. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984.
Fernandes, Alison. “Varieties of Epistemic Freedom.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 4 (2016): 736–51.
Ginet, Carl. “Might We Have No Choice.” In Freedom and Determinism, edited by Keith Lehrer, 87–104. Studies in Philosophy. New York: Random House, 1966.
Henden, Edmund. “Deliberation Incompatibilism.” Dialectica 64, no. 3 (2010): 313–33.
Inwagen, Peter van. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983.
Jones, David. “Deliberation and Determinism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1968, 255–64.
Kapitan, Tomis. “Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives.” The Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 143 (1986): 230–51.
———. “Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative.” American Philosophical Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1989): 31–41.
Levy, Neil. “Determinist Deliberations.” Dialectica 60, no. 4 (2006): 453–59.
Nelkin, Dana Kay. “Deliberative Alternatives.” Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1 (2004): 215–40.
———. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
———. “The Sense of Freedom.” In Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, 105–34. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004.
Nielsen, K. M. “Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle’s Alternative to the Presumption of Open Alternatives.” Philosophical Review 120, no. 3 (January 1, 2011): 383–421.
Pendergraft, Garrett. “Against Deliberation Restrictions.” Religious Studies 50, no. 03 (September 2014): 341–57.
Pereboom, Derk. “A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation.” The Journal of Ethics 12, no. 3–4 (September 2008): 287–306.
———. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Pettit, Philip. “Determinism with Deliberation.” Analysis 49, no. 1 (1989): 42–44.
Searle, John R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001.
Small, Robin. “Fatalism and Deliberation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 1 (1988): 13–30.
Stapleton, Sean. “Hard Incompatibilist Challenges to Morality and Autonomy.” PhD diss., Cornell University, 2010.
Taylor, Richard. “Deliberation and Foreknowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1964): 73–80.
———. “Deliberation and Freedom.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 4 (1968): 265–68.
Waller, Bruce N. “Deliberating about the Inevitable.” Analysis 45, no. 1 (1985): 48–52.


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