This is the first post in what I hope to be a series of bibliographies/timelines dealing with subjects related to deliberation, determinism, indeterminism and free will. This version covers those who have engaged in debate about the Belief in Ability Thesis (the claim that rational deliberation/decision-making requires belief in the ability to perform more than one action) as well as a few related people from the free will literature who do not discuss BAT directly. I have distinguished Deliberation-Compatibilists primarily on whether they endorse an epistemic reading of BAT (you merely need to have more than one epistemically possible action to deliberate rationally) or reject it entirely. Next time I hope to begin adding in philosophers from the decision theory side of things. I am particularly interested in knowing if I have missed anyone out here (full references follow at the bottom of the post):
Ginet 1966 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist (?) – Original Consequence Argument which could be applied to decision-making.
Taylor 1964,1966,1968 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist
Jones 1968 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to Taylor 1968.
Cowan 1969 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Appears to deny any form of BAT, i.e. accepts that deliberation is compatible with knowing what you will do.
Van Inwagen 1983 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Consequence argument could be applied to decision-making, and the famous Two Door case.
Dennett 1984 – Deliberation-Compatibilist, see Ch. 5
Waller 1985 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to van Inwagen 1983, rejects any version of BAT
Kapitan 1986 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT
Small 1988 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT
Kapitan 1989 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires an epistemic version of BAT
Pettit 1989 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Argues for a negative/epistemic reading of BAT
Clarke 1992 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Rejects any form of BAT (allows agents to deliberate even if they know what they will do).
Bok 1998 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Endorses a kind of perspectivist view on which we must take ourselves to be free in decision-making, but this does not affect our beliefs.
Searle 2001 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist (See 10-14)
Broadie 2001 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Novel argument on the basis of knowability of counterfactuals.
Nelkin 2004a, 2004b – Deliberation-Compatibilist
Coffman and Warfield 2005 – Agnostic – Endorses a strong reading of BAT but does not take sides on the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate.
Levy 2006 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT
Pereboom 2008 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT
Henden 2010 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist
Stapleton 2010 (dissertation) – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Argument on the basis of psychology/non-ideal rationality.
Nelkin 2011 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Not entirely clear on whether she endorses an epistemic reading of BAT or rejects it entirely.
Nielsen 2011 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Argues against any form of BAT
Clarke 2013 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Response to Nelkin 2011
Pereboom 2014 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Requires epistemic version of BAT
Pendergraft 2014 – Deliberation-Compatibilist – Religious context but argument does not depend on any religious assumptions.
Fernandes 2016 – Deliberation-Compatibilist-ish – Beginning to bridge the gap between the free will/action theory literature and decision theory.
Cohen 2017 – Deliberation-Incompatibilist – Four cases manipulation argument against deliberation-compatibilism